Question Nine. Whether the image of the Trinity exists in the mind distinctly

Bonaventure, Sent. 1 d.3 q.3
Alexander of Hales, Summa Ia q.61 p.3 a.1
Scotus, Sent. 1 d.3 q.9
Thomas, ST Ia q.93 aa.5-6
Richard of St. Victor, Sent. 1 d.3 q.1 a.2
Durandus, Sent. 1 d.3 q.4
Francis of Meyronnes, Sent. 1 d.3 q.4
John Bacconitanus, Sent. 1 d.3 q.3

1. The final question in this distinction is whether there is in the soul distinctly an image of the Trinity.

2. That there is not: Because then we could naturally come to a distinct knowledge of the Trinity through it. The proof of the consequence is as follows: an image is per se reflective of that of which it is the image,     etc .

3. Further, the mind represents one [divine] person in the mind no more than it represents another, as is plain from Augustine On the Trinity 15.7, 14 when he says that the Father is intellective memory - will as also memory - and the Son likewise; therefore      the memory represents the Father no more distinctly than it represents the Son, and conversely.

4. Further, in the Trinity there are two produced persons in image, namely Son and the Holy Spirit; but no person is produced in memory, and consequently memory does not represent any production, and so neither is it the Trinity. The proof that no person is produced in the memory is that the acts themselves are the things exemplified in the soul, and not the second acts [see n.8 infra]; for there is no action of action since there would then be an infinite regress in the action, etc.

5. On the contrary: Augustine in On the Trinity 14 says that an image of the Trinity must be looked for, and it must be found where our nature possesses nothing better in itself, etc.

To the Question

6. The first thing that needs to be stated is what in creatures the idea of image is taken from. About this I say that an image represents the whole per se (just as I say that a trace or footprint represents a part per se [e.g. a horse’s foot] and represents the whole inferentially [e.g. a horse] as to the idea of the species of the whole [e.g. some horse or other and not this particular horse]); and I say that an image is naturally fit to imitate and to express that of which it is the image.     Therefore , although a thing may be altogether like another thing, yet, because it does not imitate that other thing, it should not be called an image of it. Hence the impression of a foot in the ground is an image truly of the foot but it is a trace or footprint of the whole animal, etc     .

7. The second thing that must be stated is in respect of what in God the idea of image in us is taken. About this I say that it is in respect of the three persons and of the one essence and of the procession of the persons. Here one must note that the concept of one person is a concept that is partial in respect of the whole Trinity. As to creatures, which lead us by way of image to a knowledge of the whole Trinity, they will represent the whole Trinity as to the total concept that our intellect can have of it; so they will represent the distinction of the persons, the unity of the essence, and the order of origin; for the real distinction that exists in divine reality by relations of origin will have an essential imitation in respect of the Trinity that creatures represent.

8. I reply that what needs to be stated is where in us the image is. Here one must note that in the mind there are first acts, namely intellect and will, and second acts, namely intellection and volition;First act is the existence in the soul of the powers of intellect and will; second act is the exercising of these powers in acts of understanding and willing. ¹³⁰ and the principles of these second acts are principles distinct in respect of their formal ideas, which formal ideas are act and will in the presence of their objects. Because of this the acts are of diverse ideas, for the cognitive act and the other volitional act will have distinct principles, etc.

9. Now one must note that the image does not consist only in acts of paternity, first because there are only two such acts (and so the image would be only of a duality and not also of a trinity); and second because between these acts there is no real distinction of thing and thing, nor is there an order of origin either (though there is consubstantiality because a unity, albeit an essential unity, is communicated to the soul); and third because one of these acts is not produced by the other - not even in the case of individual acts, first because the acts are not essentially the same, and second because of the other two reasons just stated, namely that there are only two acts and that one does not originate from the other, etc.

10. I then say that the image consists in first and second acts in the following way, that the soul, qua having in itself the perfection of understanding and willing in idea of second act (namely in respect of knowledge generated along with the object present to it in idea of object), has the idea of memory and of parent (as of a father). However, to the extent that the soul has in itself the perfection of being able to receive generated knowledge in itself, it has the idea of a word; and to the extent the soul has in itself the perfection of being able to receive produced love, it thus has the idea of something spirated. And in this way the soul will be a trinity, of which the first part will be the parent, the second the thing generated, and the third the thing spirated, etc.

11. However there are here two doubts. The first is that there seems here to be a quarternity, because knowledge is produced from one memory and love is produced from another memory,     etc .

12. On this point note that the first act in respect of volition, as namely the will, does not go together in the image with any of the three [n.10]: not with the third part because the same thing is not the principle of itself; and not with the second part because actual intelligence is not will; and not with the first part because memory is said properly to be the productive principle of generated knowledge; therefore      the will is a fourth with them, etc.

13. The second doubt is that generated knowledge does not go together with the production of love the way that, in divine reality, the first person by nature originates the second person, and the first and second person originate the third. It is not like this in the image, because neither is the first the cause of the second nor are the first and second the cause of the third, etc.

14. I reply by saying that Augustine assigns or gives two ideas of image. The first is in On the Trinity 9, and it is mind, knowledge, and love. The other he gives in On the Trinity 10 as follows: memory, intelligence, and will. When dealing with these two in On the Trinity 15 he says that what is said in the case of the fourth in the listing [sc. memory] is more evident to the extent that memory expresses the idea of parent more than mind does.

15. To make clear the first part of the image [sc. mind and memory], note that mind can be taken in two ways: either we can understand by mind a first and perfect act with respect to both second acts (namely fecundity in generating a son and fecundity in spirating a holy spirit). In this way mind possesses the perfect idea of parent, because it includes both fecundities. And between these acts, namely knowledge and love, there are two objects produced in a certain order, and so there will not be a quaternity, because in a parent that has the idea of parent perfectly there occurs a double first act. And this is the way it is in divine reality, because there is in the Father a fecundity for generating and also for spirating, and the Father has this fecundity from himself and not as derived from something else, namely from the production of the Son (as some say). The proof of this is that it would then follow that the Father never had the fecundity in question; for the Father does not in any way have from production of the Son any reality whether absolute or relative, and so he will never have any reality that he does not have in the first moment of origin (namely insofar as he is pre-understood in order of origin to the Son); therefore he does not have this sort of fecundity of generating and spirating from production of the Son.

16. In another way mind can be taken precisely for first act alone, namely as it has only a fecundity for generating or a fecundity in respect of generated knowledge (which is the same thing). And in this way the idea of image is imperfectly assigned to it, and in this way too mind does not have perfectly the idea of parent.

17. Thus, about the way image is assigned when memory is posited, I say, neither more nor less, that if memory is taken precisely as first act in respect of generated knowledge, or in respect of being generator, then in this way the idea of image is imperfectly assigned. But if memory is taken as it states first act as first act is perfect with respect to both second acts (namely fecundity for generating and for spirating), then memory has perfectly the idea of parent. And thus is the idea of image assigned perfectly by Augustine,     etc .

18. I then say that mind or memory should be taken as it has the perfect idea of parent; but it is not perfectly parent save as it is taken in respect of knowledge and love -as is plain, because the Father in divine reality has in himself fecundity for both. Therefore     , in the case of the mind in the first way of assigning image, or in the case of memory in the second way (or for the first part of the image) [n.14], the soul must be taken as it means the idea of the first act of the intellect, along with its object present to it in idea of object, and the idea of the first act of the will, along with its object present to it in idea of object, etc.

19. In the case of the second part of the image, generated knowledge, or the word, is taken for it; and in the case of the third part produced love is taken for it; and so it is plain that there is no quaternity there, because a double relation of fecundity is combined in the parent, if it is perfectly parent.

20. To the second doubt [n.13] I say that, because generated knowledge is an accident in the case of the soul and because an accident cannot have the idea of a producer, therefore, when memory generates knowledge, it does not communicate to it a fecundity of spirating the way this happens in divine reality (where generated knowledge is subsistent and has the same communicated nature as in the generator); and so, to this extent, and also as to real identity in absolute thingness according to distinction of relation, there is not a total similarity between the image and the Trinity, as is plain; yet the second and third part of the image have, even if not an order of origin, yet some natural order properly, because volition naturally and necessarily presupposes intellection, and an origin can in some way be assigned to them, because intellection goes together with the idea of parent of love. For the object of the will is necessarily actually known, just as the object of the intellect is formally actually in the phantasm; and thereby one can see how the agent intellect belongs to the image, etc.

To the Arguments

21. To the first principal argument [n.2] I say that the assigning of an image of the Trinity in the soul only avails for someone who believes the Trinity, to enable him to investigate it in some way; but it does not do so for the sake of the Trinity becoming naturally known, first because the soul is not created by God as he is a Trinity, and second because the things mentioned [sc. in the image] are all primary together, as is plain.

22. To the second [n.3] I say that the major premise would be effective if the Father were posited as generating insofar as he understands (as some say) - and badly posited, as was proved above, because the Father does not generate in this way; rather, as I said, the Father has the divine essence by a second distinction present to himself under the idea of being actually intelligible (which belongs to the Father as he is memory) and in this way does he generate; but, as was made clear above, he does not generate insofar as he understands. And     therefore I say that the antecedent is false, because the memory does not represent the Father more than the Son by the fact that memory alone exists in the Father, or that intelligence alone exists in the Son, but by the fact that the Father generates the Son insofar as he has the idea of memory and not as he has the idea of intelligence or will, etc     .

23. To the third [n.4] I say that second acts are produced. The argument is pro se. Hence when it is said then there is no action of action, or action is not the term of action, and this [sc. some production] truly terminates action, as Augustine says On the Trinity 9 last chapter that knowledge is generated, and in On the Trinity 15.27 that volition proceeds - then these are not actions in the genus of action but are absolute forms in the genus of quality.

24. When you prove [n.4] that they are properly actions because they are second acts, I say that there are certain forms which have a fixed and permanent being not dependent on their cause (as heat in wood), and that there are certain forms which have a communicated dependence on their cause, as light in the medium depends on the sun; and about this Augustine says, Literal Commentary on Genesis 8.9, that the air has not been made bright but is being made bright; thus the first forms, because they are independent of their cause in existing, are not actions and are not called actions; but the second forms, because of their independence,The printed text says ‘independence’, but it may be a misprint for ‘dependence’. ¹³¹ seem to have their existence rather in becoming than in being, which is why they seem to be actions; and yet in truth they are not actions, because they have their parts together all at once, which is something repugnant to action, and they are not in a passive thing either, because they have existence at once in the whole and part is not acquired after part; and intellection and volition are forms of this sort, for they have a continuing dependence on the presence of their cause, etc.

25. Intellection and volition pass over into something other as to their term. It is unintelligible that volition and intellection exist and are not of something (I care not what that something is). It seems that they are called second acts because of this continuing dependence and because they pass over to a term; but in fact they are immanent forms, being whole all at once and not as things acquired part after part,     etc .